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merely an abuse of power, rather than a complete want of power. Central Trust Co. v.
Smurr & Kamen Machine Co., I9I Ill. App. 613 (1915); see Ill. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 54
(x934). Thus it was urged by counsel for the plaintiff in the principal case that since
the power of contract for old age belaefits was given to one part of the organization,
namely the local lodges, the association in contracting through the central office had
not acted beyond its powers but had merely wrongfully used powers given it. The
court did not discuss this argument. Indeed the major part of the court's emphasis was
upon the hardship and injustice involved in refusing to enforce the contract, fully performed by the plaintiff. In support of its decision the court cited supreme court decisions made when the earlier "estoppel" rule prevailed and ignored later cases setting up
the "void" rule.
Criticism of the appellate court for thus quietly asserting its independence is easy.
But the whole doctrine of ultra vires has enjoyed little favor in recent legal opinion.
The limited capacity theory is denounced as unsound, the corporation portrayed as a
real thing, not merely a creature of the law which created it. Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 253 (I91i); Warren, Collateral Attack on Incorporation. B.
in General, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 305, 307 (1908). Once the limited capacity theory loses
its dominance, the doctrine of ultra vires ceases to be necessary. In its place is proposed the agency rule of apparent authority. See Stevens, A Proposal as to the Codification and Restatement of the Ultra Vires Doctrine, 36 Yale L. J. 297 (1927); Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires be Discarded? 33 Yale L. J. 49 (1923);
Ballantine, Proposed Revision of the Ultra Vires Doctrine, 12 Corn. L. Q. 453 (1927).
Where it is not specifically prohibited or contrary to public policy, a contract would be
binding even though not authorized if the parties reasonably supposed it to be within
the authority of the corporation. Under this rule there would be no constructive notice
of a statute unless it contains a specific prohibition. Injury to stockholders and to the
state can be prevented to a certain extent by stockholder- and attorney-general suits
but in any event such injury is outweighed by the greater injury to third persons under
the void rule. The Illinois legislature apparently concurs in this argument since it recently abolished ultra vires as a defense for most corporations. Ill. Bus. Corp. Act § 8
(i933), Smith-Hurd ll. Rev. Stats. 1935, c. 32, § 157.8. See also Cal. Civ. Code 1931,
§ 345; Mason's Minn. Stats. 1927, c. 58, § 7492-10, ii (supp. 1936). Since the Business Corporation Act does not apply to fraternal beneficiary societies, however, such
corporations are still subject to the existing law. If the legislature desires to impose
extraordinary restrictions upon the contractual powers of insurance companies, it
should rely on express legislation, not on the uncertain mercies of ultra vires.

Criminal Law-Director and Corporate Crime-Principal and Accessory[Illinois].-The Illinois Motor Fuel Tax Act provides that distributors of gasoline who
are not licensed and who wilfully fail to account for taxes collected under the Act
should be subject to fine and imprisonment. Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stats. ch. 120, § 431
(I93O). For repeated violations of these provisions the Blue Rose Oil Co., a corporation, was dissolved under § 82 of the Business Corporation Act. Blue Rose Oil Co. v.
People, 360 Ill. 397, 196 N.E. 456 (1935). The defendant, who was the president and
active controller of the corporation's policies, was indicted as an accessory before the
fact for aiding and abetting the corporation in its violations. From a judgment of the
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lower court fining and imprisoning him, the defendant appealed. Held, judgment reversed. The corporation as principal was not subject to the penal provisions of the
Act, because a corporation cannot be imprisoned. Since an accessory is not liable to
greater punishment than his principal, the defendant is not subject to the penal provisions of the Act. Ducaxn v. People, 363 Ill. 495, 2 N.E. (2d) 705 (1936).*
Since the instant case, if followed, will take the teeth out of the penal provisions of
the Motor Fuel Tax Act, a careful examination of the premises on which it rests is advisable.
The Illinois accessory statute provides that the accessory "shall be considered as
principal and punished accordingly" and that the accessory can be convicted "whether
the principal is convicted or amenable to justice or not. . . ." Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev.
Stats. 1935 c. 38, §§ 582, 583. As early as 1846, the statute was construed as making
the accessory guilty of the same offense as the principal. Baxter v. People, 8 Ill. 368
(1846). Other courts relying on similar accessory statutes have succeeded in imprisoning the directory-accessory of the corporate-principal. Wood v. United States, 2o4 Fed.
55, 5 8 (C.C.A. 4th 1913); Kaufman v. United States, 212 Fed. 613 (C.C.A. 2d 1914);
Rex v. Campbell, 5 Dom. L. Rep. 370 (1912). Hence, it would seem that the court could
easily have found the defendant guilty of the same violation as the corporation and
punishable independently. But the court read into the statute the common law rule
that an accessory is immune from more severe punishment than his principal. See 2
Stephens, History of the Criminal Law of England 229 ff (1883); Miller, Criminal
Law 242 (1934). This rule could'operate in three situations: (i) if the accessory is
convicted although the principal has been acquitted; (2) if the accessory is given the
maximum punishment although mitigating circumstances have operated to lessen the
principal's punishment; (3) if the accessory is convicted although the principal is inaccessible and probably will never be actually punished. See Commonwealth v. Phillips,
i6 Mass. 422 (1820) (accessory freed because of suicide of principal). The immunity
afforded the accessory in the last situation was especially undeserved and inspired
remedial legislation. Whether or not this legislation removes the immunity in the
first two situations is disputed. Sears, Principal and Accessories, Some Modern Problems, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 845 (i931) (An accessory may be convicted after acquittal of the
principal. State v. Bogue, 52 Kan. 79, 34 Pac. 410 (1893); contra, State v. St. Philip,
169 La. 468, 125 So. 451 (1929). An accessory may be guilty of a greater offense than
the principal. Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St. 457, 21 N.E. 476 (1889); contra, Nuthill v.
State, 30 Tenn. 247 (1850).) But it is universally agreed that the inaccessibility of the
principal does not preclude the conviction of the accessory. See Miller, Criminal Law
242 ff (i934). In the instant case the court rested the defendant's immunity not upon
the acquittal of the principal, nor upon the circumstances mitigating the "corporation's guilt," but solely upon the physical impossibility of imprisoning the corporation.
The court should have found that the close analogy between the inaccessibility of the
dead principal and the impossibility of imprisoning the corporate principal brought
the situation within the minimum scope of the accessory statute.
A possible distinction, however, might be advanced between the dead principal and
* Compare two recent Illinois cases dealing with failure to pay taxes collected under the
Motor Fuel Tax Act as embezzlement. People v. Strong, 2 N.E. (2d) 942 (Ill. 1936) (indictment against director quashed); People v. Kopman, 358 Ill. 479, 193 N.E. 516 (1934) (indictment against partner sustained).
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the corporation. The inaccessibility of the former is fortuitous; the inaccessibility of
the latter is inherent in the nature of the criminal. The force of this objection rests
upon the difference between a natural person imd a jural entity. But it is precisely this
difference which makes the principal-accessory alliance between the corporation and
its director a fiction. And once a court has assumed the existence of the principalaccessory relationship, the fictional nature of such a relationship can no longer be
made the basis of exonerating the accessory.
A court even though determined to use a fiction could easily have selected a less
treacherous one. Thus, the court could have regarded the director as a co-principal, as
principal in the second degree since he was "present" when the crime was committed,
or regarded the director as the principal and the corporation as accessory, or even regarded the corporation as the innocent agent of the defendant. Any one of these fictions might have been used without danger of affording undeserved immunity to the
defendant. It is noteworthy, moreover, that even using the principal and accessory
approach and even assuming the validity of the premise that an accessory is immune
from greater punishment than his principal, the court should have imposed, at least, a
fine, without imprisonment for non-payment, upon the defendant. Perhaps the magnitude of the punishment which might have been imposed ($36,ooo or 65 years in jail)
made the court reluctant to impose any punishment at all. But compare the Illinois
court's attitude toward severe punishment in People v. Elliott, 272 Ill. 592, 185 N.E.
6o5 (1916).
But a resort to fiction was unnecessary. Since corporate acts and omissions are ultimately attributable to human agents, a more literal approach would be to apply the
ordinary tests of criminality to the acts and omissions of these agents. Lee, Corporate
Criminal Liability, 28 Col. L. Rev. 1,18i (1928). When the duty violated by the individual is one that rests on him apart from his relation to the corporation, the application of this test is simple. Thus, the case of a director who commits a murder designed
to further corporate ends and authorized by the board of directors and stockholders
involves merely the problem of a group of natural individuals collaborating in the
commission of a crime. But when the duty is one that rests on the entity and must be
delegated, the problem is whether the law renders one in the defendant's relation to the
corporation criminally accountable for non-performance of the corporate duty. See
Rex v. Pittwood, ig T. L. R. 37 (1902). In the instant case, since the defendant is not
a distributor within the intendment of the statute, his failure to pay taxes is not a
crime apart from his relation to the corporation. Since there is no common law rule
imposing liability on a director for failing to perform this corporate duty, the court
could have imposed criminal liability only by relying on the Motor Fuel Tax Act.
Thus, the court might well have resorted to the following argument: The legislature
must have intended the penal provisions to apply equally to all violators and hence, to
corporate violators. But since the penal provisions can only apply to natural persons,
the-legislature must have "intended" some natural persons within the corporate personnel to be subject to the provisions. The only candidates are the stockholders and
the directors and employees. But since the directors are the only persons who could
have prevented the commission of the crime, the legislature must have intended to
impose liability on them.
Statutes drafted with greater care than the Motor Fuel Tax Act are necessary if
courts are not to be compelled to choose between the principal-accessory metaphor,
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and intricate statutory construction in order to reach those in control of a corporation.
A statute which defines a crime that may possibly be committed by a corporation
should sharply distinguish: (i) the punishment of the entity by a fine; (2) the punishment of the directors, active or passive, by fine or imprisonment; (3) punishment of the
stockholders by imprisonment or fine that operates directly rather than indirectly by a
pro ratadiminution of corporate assets; (4) the punishment of the employee personally
guilty of the wrongful act or omissions. See Lee, Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 Col.
L. Rev. 181, 189 (1928). It may be noted that the employee as such will seldom be
actually punished. See State v. Parsons, 12 Mo. App. 205 (1882); United States v.
Midlen, 53 Fed. 229 (D.C. Kan. 1892). Since the primary purpose of penal provisions
is to deter violations of the law, they should be concentrated upon directors and officers
whose control enables them to prevent corporate criminality. The imposition of criminal liability upon the directors exclusively would have two beneficial effects: (i) It
would relieve the stockholders from what is, in effect, vicarious criminal liability. In
view of the increasing separation between ownership and control, such stockholder
immunity seems highly desirable. (2) It would enable courts to imprison culpable
directors even though they could not solve the long-standing riddle of how to imprison
the jural entity.
Equity-Trade Regulations-Price Fixing by Equitable Decree-[linois].--Memhers of the plaintiff association, comprising most of the cleaners and dyers of Chicago,
agreed to maintain a minimum price list. The association attempted to persuade independent cleaner shops outside the association to maintain the same list price or sell
out to the association. The defendants, independent cleaners and dyers, cut prices.
Racketeering and reduction in wages for workers in the industry resulted. The plaintiff
association seeks to enjoin the defendants from cutting prices. From decree enjoining
the defendants and plaintiffs from selling their services for less than a fixed price, the
defendants appeal. Held, decree reversed. Price-cutting does not, of itself, constitute
unfair competition; and equitable relief from the consequences of fair competition will
not be granted. Cleaning and Dyeing P. 0. Ass'n v. Sterling Cleanersand Dyers et al.,
2 N.E. (2d) 149 (Ill. 1936).
Members of the plaintiff association, comprising most of the barbers of Chicago,
agreed to maintain a minimum price list. The defendants, independent barbers as well
as members of the association, cut prices. Racketeering and reduction in wages for
workers in the industry resulted. The plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendants from
cutting prices. Held, decree granted. Price-cutting below a fixed minimum will be
enjoined to protect industry from ruinous practices. Master Barbers' Ass'n v. Baiata
et al., Chicago Daily Tribune, July 30, 1936, p. 3.
Price-cutting per se has never been regarded as unfair competition. See School
Master'sCase, Y.B. ii Hen. IV 47 (4io); U.S. v. Sutherland,9 F. Supp. 204, 206 (Mo.
1934); Nims, Unfair Competition § 300 (3d ed. 1929). But price-cutting effected under
varying conditions has been so regarded. For price-cutting incidental to temporary
competition which is designed to injure others rather than to promote the defendant's
economic interests, liability has been imposed. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119
N.W. 946 (igog) (banker entered barber business for sole purpose of eliminating plaintiff and retired after its withdrawal); Dunshee v. StandardOil Co., 152 Iowa 618, 132
N.W. 371 (191i)
(wholesaler entered retail business for the sole purpose of driving out

